The petitioner, Debi, sought a determination pursuant to s. 58 of WESA whether the signed document of her deceased father, Larry, dated February 7, 2016, represented his intentions to replace his Will dated August 11, 2015. The petition was not opposed. This case was another example which highlighted the use of the s. 58 curative provisions of WESA to assist the court in determining an individuals' wishes after death.
Dr. Philp (84) brought a claim under s. 2 of the Wills Variation Act as he felt the will of his wife did not make adequate provision for him. While both Dr. Philp and the deceased had previous marriages, they had a long relationship together and were married for 31 years. The will provided Dr. Philp a life interest in the family farm property (owned originally by the couple as joint tenants) as well as the income generated from the residue of the estate until his death. The value of the estate at the time of death was valued at $677,000.
Two sisters were at odds over the ownership of their deceased mother’s home. In 1989 their mother had transferred the title of her home to herself and the appellant sister, Ms. Cooper, as joint tenants. Their mother died in June of 2012 and Ms. Cooper took title by survivorship. Her sister, Ms. Franklin, had argued the 1989 transfer was gratuitous and Ms. Cooper held the title of the property in trust for their mother’s estate. Ms. Cooper argued there was an agreement between her and her mother for which consideration was given. The trial judge found there was no 1989 agreement and the property was held in trust for the estate. Ms. Cooper appealed this decision.
This curious case arose after the deceased had struggled with extensive medical conditions, but he and his wife had wanted to have a family together and agreed the wife would use his reproductive material to conceive a child. The couple had agreed that regardless of whether he died, the wife would use his reproductive material to conceive. The deceased died intestate and the estate passed to his wife whereupon she applied for a declaration that the human reproductive material of her husband was her sole legal property and that it should be released to her for her use absolutely to create embryos.